




















No-clicking Event in the Quantum Key Distribution
Won-Young Hwang,∗ Intaek Lim, and Jongwon Park
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We discuss the ‘no-clicking’ event, which is harmful for legitimate users in Bennett-Brassard 1984
quantum key distribution: We describe an attack where no-clicking events are utilized in the same
way as double-clicking events are utilized in the quantum Trojan-pony attack. We discuss how to
deal with the no-clicking events. We discuss how to estimate the security of the protocol against
the proposed attack by using a formula involved with the fraction of adversarial removals of events.
PACS: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Information processing with quantum systems, e.g.,
quantum cryptography [1, 2, 3], quantum computation
[4], and quantum metrologies [5, 6], enables us to do some
tasks that we cannot do with its classical counterparts.
In addition to the practical importance, this fact has big
theoretical implications.
The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocol [2] is one of the most promising
quantum information processing techonology. Security of
the BB84 protocol was studied in the ideal case where the
source, the channel, and the detector are all perfect [7].
However, no actual device is perfect. Later, security of
the BB84 protocol in the case where the channel was im-
perfect while the source and the detector were perfect
was given [8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
An imperfect source gives rise to the problem of
photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [13, 14, 15].
Methods to deal with the problem are given in Refs. [16]
and [17]. However, the problem of the PNS attack be-
comes more serious when the imperfect source is com-
bined with loss [13, 14, 15]. Thus, a practicable long-
distance BB84 QKD system, which usually has high loss,
is not secure against the PNS attack. The decoy method
[18, 19, 20] and the SARG04 protocol [21] are two inde-
pendent ways to overcome the problem of the PNS attack
combined with high loss. The long-distance BB84 proto-
col supplemented with a decoy can be secure as long as
detectors are perfect.
A remaining step is, therefore, to resolve problems due
to imperfect detectors. Imperfect detectors give rise to
undesired events, e.g. double-clicking and no-clicking. A
no-clicking event can be easily overlooked because they
are not exposed. However, no-clicking events can give
rise to a post-selection effect as in the case of detection-
loopholes [22] for Bell’s inequality violation.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss problems due to
no-clicking in the BB84 protocol. Our presentation is in
the following order: In Section II, we describe why the no-
clicking event is problematic. In Section III, we discuss
how to deal with the no-clicking event. In Section IV, we
discuss how to estimate the security of the protocol. In
Section V, we conclude.
II. PROBLEMATIC NO-CLICKING EVENT
Let us define terminology. A loss-event is the case
where no detector of Bob clicks even when a quantum
carrier with a bit of key, e.g., a pulse of photons, was sent
by Alice. Here, Alice and Bob are the legitimate sender
and receiver of quantum carriers, respectively. The loss-
event may be either due to a channel-loss event in which
the quantum carrier was lost in the channel or due to a
no-clicking event in which the detector did not click for
certain reasons, e.g., it failed to click because of imper-
fection. That is, either channel-loss or no-clicking can
give rise to a loss-event. However, channel-loss and no-
clicking events cannot be discriminated by Alice and Bob.
The possibility that no-clicking event was problematic
was first noted in Ref. [15]. In order to deal with the no-
clicking event, they ”conservatively” assume that ”Eve
has control ... on ηB (detection efficiency),...” (Here Eve
denotes an eavesdropper.) What they mean is the fol-
lowing: As mentioned above, a loss event may be due to
either a channel-loss event or a no-clicking event. What
they assume is that detectors are perfect; thus, all loss
events are due to channel losses. Here channel losses are
due to Eve’s action.
However, imperfect detectors give rise to post-selection
effects that may be harmful for Alice and Bob. This is
implied by a few papers. The post-selection effect by
imperfect detectors is mentioned in Section XIII of Ref.
[17]. Other interesting post-selection effects are discussed
in Ref. [23] and Refs. [24] and [25]. The Referencs [24]
and [25] overlap with our paper, but are different, as will
be discussed in Section V. How to coherently deal with
all post-selection effects due to the no-clicking event, in-
cluding those works [17, 23, 24, 25], is an open problem.
In Ref. [17], they discuss the problem with detector ef-
ficiency. They give a formula (Eq. (58) of Ref. [17]) for
the key generation rate. However, a fraction ’f ’ of ran-
dom removal is not provided. Now let us see at how a
no-clicking event can be problematic in more detail.
First, let us see why Fred, a friend of Eve in detectors,
is introduced [17]. Imperfectness in detector is not some-
thing that is supposed to be in full control of Alice and
Bob. It can be that the imperfectness gives rise to sys-
tematic errors that happen to be useful for Eve. Thus,
Alice and Bob may consider the worst case in which a
hypothetical being, Fred, who wants to help his friend
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tector on or off as he wants. Because it is not excluded
that Fred can get information about the basis of the de-
tector, he is supposed to know the basis. One might say
that if a friend of Eve has access to Bob’s detector, why
doesn’t the friend read the final plain text of Bob directly
and sends it to Eve [26]. That powerful friend can break
the whole system of Alice and Bob, of course. However,
the Fred we consider is less powerful than this friend of
Eve. Fred is confined in a detector, so he cannot observe
something outside the detector by any means except by
quantum carriers given to him via a window of the de-
tector.
An alliance of Eve and Fred can cheat a careless Al-
ice and Bob, for even moderate loss, who take no ac-
count of no-clicking events: Like in the case of the quan-
tum ‘Trojan pony’ attack [17], Eve performs an opaque
(intercept-resend) attack [27] in the following way: Eve
does not know the basis of Alice, of course. However, she
does a measurement that is randomly picked up between
Z and X for each photon pulse sent by Alice. Here, Z
and X are measurements in the z basis, {|0〉, |1〉} and in
the x basis, {|0¯〉, |1¯〉}, respectively. Here, |0〉 and |1〉 are
two orthogonal states; 〈0|1〉 = 0, |0¯〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉+ |1〉),
and |1¯〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 − |1〉). When the outcome of the
Z measurement is 0 (1), Eve prepares multiple copies
of |0〉 (|1〉), namely |0〉⊗N (|1〉⊗N ). Then, she forwards
them to Bob. In the same way, when the outcome of the
X measurement is 0 (1), Eve prepares multiple copies
of |0¯〉 (|1¯〉), namely |0¯〉⊗N (|1¯〉⊗N ). Then, she forwards
them to Bob. The strategy of Fred is the following: He
splits the state |k〉⊗N (k = 0, 1, 0¯, 1¯) to |k〉⊗N−1 and |k〉.
When N − 1 is large enough, Fred can identify the state
with high reliability. If the basis of the state that Eve
has forwarded is the same as that of the detector, Fred
gives the remaining state, |k〉, to the detector. If differ-
ent, Fred turns off the switch of the detector. Now let us
see how Eve can eavesdrop without being detected. Note
that the only case in which Eve’s action can be caught is
when the basis of Eve and that of Alice and Bob alliance
do not match; Alice and Bob happen to adopt the same
basis and Eve happens to adopt the other basis. How-
ever, in the above attack, whenever a non-matching case
happens Fred turns off the detector. Therefore, Eve’s ac-
tion is not detected at all even if she performs the above
attack for every quantum carrier if Alice and Bob simply
discard no-clicking events.
The above attack using no-clicking event is in paral-
lel with the quantum Trojan pony attack [17]. In the
quantum Trojan pony attack, Eve attempts to nullify
non-matching cases by making Bob’s detector double-
click. If Alice and Bob simply discard the data for a
double-click event, the quantum Trojan pony attack re-
duces to an attack using no-clicking event in which Alice
and Bob discard the data for a no-clicking event. How-
ever, a double-clicking event can be detected directly.
Alice and Bob take into account a double-clicking event
in their estimate of the security [14, 17]. A no-clicking
event can be detected indirectly: When the detector does
not click when it is supposed to, we say that a no-clicking
event is detected. We term the attack using a no-clicking
event as a quantum ‘Trojan-dark-pony’ attack. An easy
way to maintain security is for Alice and Bob to regard
a no-clicking event as an ‘error event’ that contributes to
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) [27]. In this case,
however, loss lower-bounds the QBER. Thus, even for a
moderate loss, there is no secure protocol even if every-
thing else is perfect. Thus, this method is not practical.
III. HOW TO DEAL WITH NO-CLICKING
EVENTS
Before we discuss how to maintain security, we have
to characterize detectors for a no-clicking event. How-
ever, in order to characterize a detector, we need to find
a principle governing the behavior of the detector. At
first look, one might think that it is difficult to find the
principle governing behavior of detectors for a no-clicking
event because a no-clicking event is neither a desired nor
an ideal process. However, this is not the case.
Proposition 1: a no-clicking event can be dealt with by
using a normal quantum measurement, POM. That is,
a certain positive-operator is assigned for a no-clicking
event.
Proposition1 is already adopted in Ref. [23]. How-
ever, let us describe why Proposition 1 is valid, for those
who are not convinced. Usually, a quantum detector is
a ‘black-box’ that gives rise to macroscopically distinct
events for microscopic inputs. For example, a photon
polarization detector gives clicking of a photon detector
between two photon detectors as an output for an input
photon. However, although a no-clicking event literally
does not give a noticeable event, a no-clicking event can
still be macroscopically distinguished from other events.
Thus, there is no difficulty in assigning a number, say 0,
to a no-clicking event, like in the case of other notice-
able events. With Proposition 1, we can characterize a
no-clicking event. What we have to do is to identify the
positive-operator corresponding to a no-clicking event by
repeated measurements.
Let us now discuss how to maintain security for a no-
clicking event. First let us introduce a quantity ∆, the
fraction of adversarially removed events, that is impor-
tant in estimating the security of a protocol. In Ref. [17],
they consider a hypothetical situation where Fred can
freely remove some cases that would lead to the QBER,
for example, as he does in non-matching cases in the
quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack above. If Alice and
Bob have no knowledge on how many times Fred did the
adversarial removal, then they have to assume the worst
case that Fred did the removal all of the instances; thus,
clearly the protocol is not secure. However, if Alice and
Bob know a bound on the fraction of adversarially re-
moved event, ∆, and ∆ is small enough, then the security
of the protocol can be recovered with a reduced key gen-
3eration rate depending on the fraction ∆ [17]: The larger
the fraction ∆ is, the smaller the key generation rate is.
Therefore, the problem of estimating security reduces to
how to estimate the fraction ∆.
However, although Eve does not know the identity of
the quantum carriers that Alice has sent, it is Eve’s free-
dom that she replace Alice’s quantum carriers by any
other quantum carriers. In the quantum Trojan-dark-
pony attack, for example, it can be that a quantum car-
rier |0¯〉 is replaced by either |0〉⊗N or |1〉⊗N if the Z mea-
surement is chosen. Therefore, we must analyze Bob’s
detector for all different states of N quantum bits. If the
number of quantum bits N is unlimited, the analysis is
impossible. Thus, we assume that the number of quan-
tum bits N is bounded by a certain number M so that
the analysis can be done. This assumption amounts to
the assumption that there is a bound on light intensity
at Bob’s site, which can be checked by Bob. With the
assumption, what we have to do is to analyze all states of
quantum bits whose number is less thanM . Then, by re-
peated measurements, we estimate the positive-operator
corresponding to a no-clicking event of Bob’s detector in
each basis b, where b = z, x. With the positive-operator
thus obtained, we can calculate the detector efficiency,
ηb(|ψ〉), for each state |ψ〉 and basis b.
Let us consider the simplest case where ηb(|ψ〉) = 1 for
all states |ψ〉 and bases b. In this case, Fred has no chance
to turn off the switch; thus, the fraction ∆ is zero. Next,
let us consider a case where ηb(|ψ〉) = η0 for all states |ψ〉
and bases b. Here, η0 is a real number between 0 and 1.
Here, the question is how large the fraction ∆ is. In this
case, it is clear that the fraction ∆ is bounded by 1− η0.
This corresponds to the simple, but impractical, method
above where Alice and Bob regard a no-clicking event as
an ’error event’ contributing to the QBER. Thus, we need
to get a tighter bound for the fraction ∆. It appears that
it is hard to do so because there is no way to discriminate
accidental removals by imperfection from intentional re-
movals by Fred. However, this is not the case as far as
the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack is concerned. This
can be explained as follows: Let us recall that the basic
strategy of the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack is that
Fred suppresses (enhances) what is advantageous (disad-
vantageous) for Alice and Bob. More specifically, Fred
turns off the switch of Bob’s detector in non-matching
cases because only non-matching cases contribute to the
QBER, and he does nothing in matching cases because
in matching cases, Eve can obtain information on the key
of Alice and Bob without contributing to the QBER at
all. However, in this case where all ηb(|ψ〉)’s are iden-
tically η0, it is not that all no-clicking events are ad-
versarial removals. That is, some removals are rather
friendly for Alice and Bob: Each state is removed with
a fixed rate 1 − η0, regardless of basis b. For example,
even when |ψ〉 = |1〉⊗n (n < M) is the input state for
Bob’s detector as in the quantum Trojan-dark-pony at-
tack, the removal rates for two bases are both 1 − η0
because η(|1〉⊗n)z = η(|1〉⊗n)x = η0. Here, removals
when the detector is in the x basis are adversarial for
Alice and Bob, but those when the detector is in z basis
are friendly for Alice and Bob because this is the match-
ing case advantageous for Eve. The effect of friendly re-
movals is opposite that of adversarial removals, and here
the numbers of friendly and adversarial removals are the
same. Therefore, effectively, the fraction ∆(|1〉⊗n) for the
state |1〉⊗n is bounded by |η(|1〉⊗n)z − η(|1〉⊗n)x| = 0 re-
gardless of how those events are removed, accidentally
or intentionally. However, for other states, for example,
(|0〉+ |0¯〉)⊗n, whether an attack using the state is adver-
sarial or friendly is not as clear as in the above case. A
removal of a certain state for a basis is partially adver-
sarial while the removal of a state for the other basis is
partially friendly, and similar arguments apply.
Let us now consider the general case where ηb(|ψ〉)
depends on the state |ψ〉. For each state |ψ〉, we have
a relation that
∆(|ψ〉) ≤ |ηz(|ψ〉) − ηx(|ψ〉)|, (1)
as shown above. Then the bound ∆ for all states is simply
the maximal one among all ∆(|ψ〉)’s,
∆ ≤ Max{∆(|ψ〉)}. (2)
Our recipe in Eq. (2) is still quite loose bound for ∆. One
reason is that it is not that a state that gives maximal
∆ is the only one utilized in the actual attack. In other
words, the situation can be that the state that gives max-
imal ∆ is not so effective in the eavesdropping. However,
Eq. (2) is much tighter than the simple method above
where all no-clicking events are treated as error events.
It might be that for some detectors, the bound in Eq.
(2) is too large for a protocol to be secure. However, it
seems to be possible to design detectors such that the
no-clicking rate of each state does not depend on the ba-
sis, in which case the fraction ∆ is zero. In other words,
if loss of each state is independent of the basis then the
fraction ∆ is zero. It is notable, however, that even if the
overall loss is independent of the basis, it might be that
the the fraction ∆ is not zero because it is an absolute
value of ηz(|ψ〉) − ηx(|ψ〉) that bounds the fraction ∆ in
Eq. (1).
The bound in Eq. (2) can be easily translated to a
bound for the quantum Trojan-pony attack by only re-
placing the detector efficiency η with the probability of
a non-double-clicking event. In this case, however, the
bound in Eq. (2) is not that useful because it is not
easy to make the bound small in most natural designs of
detectors.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results in Ref. [24] overlap with ours. Let us
see how they differ. What is the same is that both es-
cape Alice and Bob’s test by keeping the detector from
clicking in the case of a non-matching basis. However,
4what we consider is more general that what they consid-
ered. What they considered is more specific, a detector
timing mismatch. Even if there is no detector timing
mismatch, therefore, detectors must be inspected for all
possible ways in order to get security. Giving security
proofs for the BB 84 QKD system with no-clicking by co-
herently dealing with all post-selection effects including
those in Refs. [17] and [23, 24, 25] is an open problem.
In conclusion, we discussed a ‘no-clicking’ event that
is harmful for Alice and Bob in the BB 84 QKD. A
no-clicking event can give rise to a post-selection ef-
fect. Specifically, we described an attack, which we term
the quantum Trojan-dark-pony attack, where no-clicking
events are utilized in the same way as double-clicking
events are utilized in the quantum Trojan-pony attack.
We discussed how to deal with the no-clicking events:
The formalism of positive-operator-valued-measurement
(POM) also applies to a no-clicking event, as is known
[23]. The problem of characterizing a no-clicking event
reduces to that of identifying a positive-operator corre-
sponding to a no-clicking event. We discussed how to
estimate the security of the protocol, against the quan-
tum Trojan-dark-pony attack with a positive-operator by
using a formula involving the fraction ∆ of adversarial re-
movals of events given in Ref. [17].
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